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ABSTRACT
An exploration of the technological behaviours of previously convicted child sexual exploitation
material (CSEM) offenders provides a foundation for future applied research into deterrence,
investigation, and treatment efforts. This study evaluates choices and transitions of individuals
previously convicted of CSEM offenses. Based on their inclusion in two sex offender registries,
anonymous survey results (n=78) were collected from English-speaking adults within the
United States. CSEM offenders chose technologies based on both utility and perceived risk;
peer-to-peer and web-browsers were the most common gateway technologies and showed
substantial sustained usage; a substantial minority of users never stored CSEM and only
viewed it; most respondents used more than one technology to view CSEM; CSEM offenders
used more countermeasures than the public but did not use encryption at higher rates;
almost all CSEM consumers started viewing adult SEM first; and countermeasures were used
primarily to reduce psychological strain (anxiety).
Keywords: Digital forensics, child pornography, child sexual exploitation material, storage,
viewing, countermeasures

1.

INTRODUCTION

The technology usage of child sexual exploitation material (CSEM) offenders is inextricably and reciprocally linked to their offending
behaviours and cognitions ( O’Brien Webster, 2007; Paquette Cortoni, 2019). On the
Internet, the choice of technologies creates
a de facto distinct ecological niche ( Ward
Beech, 2016), therefore the initial selection
of technologies and continued (or discontinued) usage of those technologies influence
offending. Because of this, understanding
the patterns of technology usage by CSEM
© 2022 JDFSL

offenders is important for investigative, deterrence, and treatment efforts.
Prior research has focused on the prevalence of the usage of specific technologies at
a particular point in time. The National
Juvenile Online Victimization (NJOV) series of studies ( Wolak et al., 2005, 2012;
Wolak, Finkelhor, Mitchell, et al., 2011), the
largest of these, looked at arrest data to identify collection composition, technologies used,
storage, and other characteristics of CSEM
offenses. These studies provided high quality
data on what was found during investigations but were not designed to identify usage
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trends that were not identified through investigative means nor identify the reasons particular offenders employed a technology. These
and other studies ( Lukas, 2013; O’Halloran
Quayle, 2010; Prichard et al., 2011; Steel,
2015; Wolak et al., 2014) also looked at long
term trends in the overall prevalence of the usage of particular technologies, but focused on
changes in aggregate usage and not changes
in an individual’s usage of technology.
There are three primary mechanisms in
which technology is utilized by CSEM consumers - to obtain or view material, to store
material, and as a countermeasure to protect them or hide their activities. Limited
research has been conducted looking at what
devices individuals have used to view CSEM,
with a higher focus on storage. An overall review of the general trends in technology usage
by CSEM consumers, including storage and
viewing, can be found in Steel et al. (2020).
The prevalence of storage on floppy disks was
not thoroughly studied, though following the
transition to the hard drive era research found
that 95% of users stored CSEM on either hard
drives or removable media (Wolak, Finkelhor, Mitchell, et al., 2011). Current storage
methods are not well studied, and prior research has either not incorporated modern
storage methods (e.g., USB flash drives) or
the methods themselves have evolved substantially (e.g., mobile storage). For example, in
the NJOV-2 study, 3% of individuals were
found to have stored their CSEM collections
on mobile devices, including iPods and media cards, and 4% used cyberlockers ( Wolak,
Finkelhor, Mitchell, et al., 2011), but these
were based on law enforcement observations
and not offender reporting. While specific
devices used to view CSEM were not comprehensively quantified, the use of specific
applications has been well quantified [e.g., (
Hurley et al., 2013; Mehta, 2001; Steel, 2009a,
2009b; Wolak et al., 2014)], although data on
Page 2

the usage of multiple applications, as well as
transitions between applications, is lacking.
This information has not been updated, however, to reflect changes in mobile technology
and subsequent increases in the use of mobile
platforms for content consumption.
Countermeasures in this context are controls, technical or behavioural, that impact
the confidentiality, availability, or integrity
of CSEM material. They may be employed
for technical purposes ranging from ensuring
anonymity to frustrating law enforcement efforts to hiding activity from a spouse or partner. Countermeasures have been proposed as
an integral part of typologies of CSEM consumers, with the use (or non-use) being a key
differentiator between classifications (Krone,
2005). Balfe et al. (2015), in reviewing prior
studies, found that the majority of CSEM
offenders did not employ countermeasures.
Wolak et al. (2005) found that 20% of offenders used “sophisticated” methods to hide
their activities, and McCarthy (2010) found
that 22% of offenders took steps to conceal
their actions. Other work has found similar
rates - Krone et al. (2017) found that 27%
of CSEM offenders changed file or directory
names, 22% deleted material, 7% used passwords, and 25% used other methods to conceal their actions. Looking specifically at encryption, usage rates by CSEM offenders have
ranged from 3% (Wolak, Finkelhor, Mitchell,
et al., 2011) to 7.7% (Krone et al., 2017).
Countermeasures may also be employed for
psychological purposes. As an example, Norris and Kaniasty (1992) identified that the
installation of door locks as a countermeasure
in physical crimes reduced the psychological
distress of homeowners. Research to-date
has not examined the psychological basis for
countermeasure usage by CSEM offenders.
This research enumerates and evaluates
the usage of technology by English-speaking
adults previously convicted of CSEM offenses
© 2022 JDFSL
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(n=78) living in the United States. It represents the first research to examine the progression of technology usage within the CSEM
offender community, including the identification of “gateway” technologies. Additionally,
it provides quantitative information on the
methods of viewing and storage of CSEM,
as well as qualitative information on why
individuals utilized a particular technology.
Finally, it looks at countermeasure usage compared directly to a baseline population and
examines the criminological as well as the
psychological reasons for employing countermeasures.

2.

METHODOLOGY

This research was part of a larger project
looking at the technological behaviours and
cognitions of CSEM offenders. The research
consisted of two surveys using two different
populations - one of the general public (used
primarily as a baseline for reference purposes)
and one of individuals previously convicted
of CSEM offenses.

2.1

Data Collection and
Population

This research was conducted using data obtained through two anonymous online surveys hosted through Qualtrics - a public survey (of non-offenders) and a survey of individuals previously convicted of CSEM offenses. The public survey population was
composed of English-speaking adults located
in the United States and consisted of 11 demographic questions and one question related
to their usage of countermeasures. Participants were recruited by Qualtrics using the
Qualtrics Panel service (Online Panels: Get
Responses for Surveys Research | Qualtrics,
n.d.), and 524 participants successfully completed the survey and passed the integrated
integrity checks. Because the population of
previously convicted CSEM offenders who
© 2022 JDFSL

selected a listed gender identity (.99, n=77)
identified primarily as male (.95, n=74) or
gender variant/non-conforming (.04, n=3),
only the subset of the population from the
public survey matching those criteria (n=254)
were used for comparisons in this research.
The second survey solicited responses via
a postal mail requesting individuals previously convicted of CSEM offenses take an
anonymous online survey related to their
prior CSEM activities. The individuals solicited had been convicted of a CSEM offense
within the past 10 years and were identified
based on their inclusion on one of two United
States sex offender registries. Of the population sent a request letter (n=2,508), a total
of 78 individuals successfully completed an
online survey that included 10 demographic
questions and 10 relevant questions related
to their usage of technologies associated with
CSEM. Prior to their participation in the
research, respondents to both surveys were
provided with information on how the data
collected would be used and both the benefits and risks associated with participation.
Respondents were required to affirmatively
consent prior to starting the survey. Any
individuals who elected not to continue with
the survey were permitted to withdraw at any
point prior to submission, and the results of
those individuals were not retained.
Respondents were provided the following
definition for CSEM, which encompassed
child pornography as well as child erotica,
but was limited to visual depictions (as opposed to text stories):
Sexually explicit material (SEM) is
considered to be any pornographic
and/or erotic images or movies depicting nude or semi-nude individuals, or individuals engaged in sexual activity, viewed for arousal purposes. Child SEM is considered to
be any SEM containing at least one
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individual believed to be under the
age of 18.
The options provided regarding technologies were generated based on a review of technology usage by CSEM offenders (Steel et al.,
2020) as well as commonly used technologies
encountered as part of CSEM investigations
(Steel, 2014).

2.2

Initial and Evolving
Technology Usage

The ecosystem where respondents first encountered CSEM was identified through a
multiple-choice question where respondents
were asked to select which of the most common technologies used to access CSEM (traditional websites, dark web, peer-to-peer, IRC,
email, non-digital, or other) they used as
a gateway. Progression was measured indirectly through the breadth of technologies
they used. Respondents were asked the percentage of time they spent using each of the
technologies noted. For each respondent, the
gateway they used was then compared to each
of the overall technologies they used, and directional pairings generated for each transition. The transitions were then tabulated
to identify the stickiness (continued usage)
and exclusivity of each technology, as well
as the most frequent progression pathways.
Finally, respondents were asked whether in
their history of viewing sexually explicit media (SEM) they initially viewed adult SEM
or CSEM.
To identify the decision-making process
used by respondents in choosing an application, they were asked about the importance
of the following common features of CSEM
technologies:
• Anonymity
• Ability to chat with others interested in
child SEM
• Ability to chat with children
Page 4

• Diversity of content available
• Ease of use
• Encryption
• Familiarity based on past usage
• Lack of Law Enforcement Presence
• Message boards where I could post questions
• Message boards where I could find links
to child SEM
• Previews for images/movies
• Quantity of content available
• Recommendations from child SEM forums
• Search functionality
• Speed
Respondents were requested to rate the
various features on a 5-point Likert scale with
choices ranging from Not at All Important
to Extremely Important.

2.3

Viewing and Storage of
CSEM

Viewing of CSEM was measured by asking
which devices a respondent ever used over
the course of their viewing history to access
CSEM content. Respondents were able to
select multiple technologies from the provided
choices (laptop computer, desktop computer,
tablet, smartphone, game console, other, or
none of the above), and were required to fill
in an open text field if “other” was selected.
The technologies used by respondents to
store CSEM were evaluated separately from
the technologies they used to view CSEM.
The categories provided were cloud storage
© 2022 JDFSL
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services (e.g., Google Drive, Dropbox), external USB thumb drives, external USB hard
drives, CD/DVDs, smartphones, game consoles, tablets, other, or none of the above.
Respondents were able to select multiple technologies and were required to fill in an open
text field if “other” was selected.
An open-ended question was asked regarding the reason they stored CSEM in the devices mentioned and inductively coded as
noted below.

2.4

Use of Countermeasures

To evaluate their use of countermeasures
specific to CSEM, respondents were asked
which of 16 countermeasures they employed
in general, and which countermeasures they
employed specifically for CSEM. Following
that, the respondents were asked to provide
their agreement with the following statements
about why they employed those countermeasures on a 7-point Likert scale from Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree:
• To reduce my anxiety about getting
caught

2.5

Likert scales were displayed using a diverging stacked bar chart, with a vertical line
representing the median value (Heiberger et
al., 2014). Comparisons between populations
were performed using a one-tailed t-test. For
the qualitative questions, common words and
phrases were identified and were inductively
grouped to facilitate the identification of common themes. The selected responses were
included with no edits to spelling, punctuation, or grammar. All results were collected
and analysed using R, with a p value of .01
used for statistical significance tests (where
appropriate).

2.6

• To hide my activities from law enforcement if caught
• To hide my activities from other individuals
• To reduce my risk of getting caught
These countermeasures were compared
to the countermeasures used by the nonoffending population to identify any deviations.
© 2022 JDFSL

Ethics

A full review of both the risks and benefits
to the participants of both surveys was conducted as part of the ethics review process.
Ethical approval was received from the Research Ethics Committee at the University
of Edinburgh on May 20, 2020. Additionally,
Institutional Review Board approval was received from George Mason University on May
13, 2020.

• To remain anonymous
• To hide my activities from a spouse or
significant other

Analysis

3.

RESULTS

The responses received in the non-offending
group were diverse as to sex, sexual preference, age, relationship status, gender identity, race, employment, and education. The
respondents within the group of individuals previously convicted of CSEM offenses
were predominantly heterosexual (.72, n=56),
white (.88, n=69), and gender identified as
males (.95, n=74).

3.1

Initial and Evolving Usage

Of the respondents that indicated using a
technology (n=76), peer-to-peer software was
the most common gateway technology, with
46% (n=35) of respondents using it to access
Page 5
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Figure 1. Breadth of Technology Usage
CSEM for the first time. Traditional websites
(sites on the open web, as opposed to those on
the dark web) were the second most common
at 30% (n=23), followed by the dark web
and non-digital media (e.g., print magazines),
each at 7% (n=5). In terms of overall usage,
peer-to-peer was the highest at 46%, with
the largest number of users (.66, n=50) using
it as part of their technical CSEM activities.
Traditional websites were the second most
used at 22%, with the second highest number
of users (.45, n=34), followed by the dark
web at 15% and the third most users (.29,
n=22). The greatest divergence present was
with instant messaging, which had a small
gateway role (.01, n=1), but larger overall
usage at 12% and number of users at 12%
(n=9). The detailed results are shown in
Table 1.
In terms of breadth, the most common
pattern was the usage of a single technology
(.46, n=35), with no respondents using more
than 4 technologies. Approximately 54% of
respondents (n=41) indicated the use of at
least one additional technology (Figure 1).
Additionally, 54% (n=41) of individuals used
their primary technology of choice more than
90% of the time.
Looking at progression of usage, the most
frequently followed pathway was continued
usage of the gateway technology, with 87%
(n=66) indicating overall continued usage. Of
Page 6

the transitions to a different technology, the
transition from Peer-to-Peer to traditional
websites (.13, n=10), the transition from
Peer-to-Peer to the dark web (.12, n=9), and
the transition from traditional websites to
Peer-to-Peer (.08, n=6) were the most frequent (Table 2).
Looking at the use of adult SEM as a gateway, only a single respondent (1%) indicated
that they started viewing CSEM first. Three
additional respondents (4%) indicated that
they started viewing both adult SEM and
CSEM at the same time. The remainder,
95% (n=74), indicated that they began viewing adult SEM and transitioned to CSEM.
When choosing a technology to engage
with CSEM, the most important factor cited
was anonymity, with 82% (n=64) indicating that aspect was of at least moderate importance. That was followed by ease of use
at 69% (n=54), a lack of law enforcement
presence at 67% (n=52), familiarity with the
technology at 65% (n=51), and the amount
of content available at 64% (n=50). Social
functions, including the ability to chat with
others about CSEM (.15, n=12), the ability
to chat with children (.05, n=4), and the ability to ask questions on message boards (.04,
n=3) had very few individuals indicating they
were important. Detailed factor information
is shown in Figure 2.

3.2

Viewing and Storage of
CSEM

The majority of respondents utilized either a
desktop (.59, n=46) or a laptop (.58, n=45)
to view CSEM, with 92% (n=72) using at
least one of the two options. Smartphones
were used by 27% of respondents (n=21), and
35% (n=27) viewed CSEM on more than one
device (Table 3).
When asked why they stored CSEM using
their chosen technology, the largest number
© 2022 JDFSL
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Table 1. Starting and overall usage of technologies by CSEM offenders

Technology
Peer-to-Peer software (BitTorrent, Shareaza,
Ares, Kazaa)
Traditional websites
Dark web (using TOR)
Non-electronic (magazine, photograph, etc.)
IRC (Internet Relay Chat)
None Provided
eMail
Newsgroups
Yahoo Groups
Unspecified/Other
Instant Messaging
Cyberlockers
Local/Self-Produced
Other Chat
Skype
I have used a virtual machine to hide my
activities
I have never taken any of these actions
I have downloaded a guide on hiding my activities
I have used steganography to hide content

Overall
Usage
Gateway Usage Proportion

Proportion and of
Respondents

0.46 (n=35)

0.46

0.66 (n=50)

0.30 (n=23)
0.07 (n=5)
0.07 (n=5)
0.03 (n=2)
0.03 (n=2)
0.01 (n=1)
0.01 (n=1)
0.01 (n=1)
0.03 (n=2)
0.01 (n=1)
-

0.22
0.15
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0
0
0.12
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

0.45 (n=34)
0.29 (n=22)
0.01 (n=1)
0.12 (n=9)
0.03 (n=2)
0.04 (n=3)
0.04 (n=3)
0.01 (n=1)
0.01 (n=1)
0.12 (n=9)
0.03 (n=2)
0.01 (n=1)
0.01 (n=1)
0.03 (n=2)

0.05 (n=4)

0.04 (n=3)

0.09 (n=22)

0.04 (n=3)
0.04 (n=3)
0 (n=0)*

0.04 (n=3)
0.12 (n=9)
0 (n=0)

0.21 (n=54)
0.07 (n=18)
0.05 (n=13)

Figure 2. Importance of Features in Choosing a CSEM Application
of individuals (.45, n=35) cited convenience
and ease of use to facilitate future viewing:

• “Because I didn’t want to look for it in
the internet again.”

• “Because in 2003, It was easier to store
the files rather than streaming or redownloading them.”

• “To view later. It was like a hoarding
addiction. Then I would cycle into depression and delete and destroy the evidence.”

• “Easily accessible for organizing and peer
to peer file sharing.”

The second most common reason (.19,
n=15) cited involved the storage device being

© 2022 JDFSL

Page 7

JDFSL 2022
used as a countermeasure, either to hide the
files or facilitate encryption:

Table 2. Most frequent pathways of technology progression
Pathway
P2P->Web
P2P->Tor
Web->P2P
Web->Tor
Web->IM
Web->IRC
P2P->IM
IRC->P2P
Non-Digital->Web
Web->Other
P2P->IRC
Web->Skype
Newsgroups->P2P

Proportion and
# of Respondents
0.13 (n=10)
0.12 (n=9)
0.08 (n=6)
0.07 (n=5)
0.05 (n=4)
0.04 (n=3)
0.03 (n=2)
0.03 (n=2)
0.03 (n=2)
0.03 (n=2)
0.03 (n=2)
0.03 (n=2)
0.03 (n=2)

• “I was trying to hide my addiction and
did not want to alert others, so I just
downloaded it to the computers hard
drive and put the images in folders under
different names.”
• “Easy access and child could not accidentally find as hard drive was disconnected
when i was not there”
• “To encrypt and hide.”
The third most cited reason was that it
was the default location, and/or that there
was no specific choice to store it using that
technology (.14, n=11), with a smaller number indicating that they never stored any on
the listed devices (.12, n=9). The remaining
responses had no common theme (.14, n=11)
(Table 4).

3.3

Table 3. Devices used to view CSEM
Device Type
Desktop Computers
Laptop Computers
Smartphones
Tablets
Game consoles
None of the above

Page 8

Proportion and
# of Respondents
0.59 (n=46)
0.58 (n=45)
0.27 (n=21)
0.05 (n=4)
0.03 (n=2)
0.05 (n=4)

Use of Countermeasures

Overall, 96% (n=75) of respondents indicated
using at least one countermeasure in general usage (m=5.1, sd=3.4), a significantly
higher proportion than a reference population of non-offenders (m=3.2, sd=3.7) (t =
4.2, df = 135, p<.01). When asked specifically about their use of countermeasures in
their CSEM viewing, the number decreased
to 88% (n=69) of respondents using countermeasures (m=3.6, sd=3.0). The most frequently used countermeasure for both nonCSEM and CSEM related actions was the
deletion of web browsing, at .86 (n=67) and
.68 (n=53), respectively (Table 5).
Looking at the differences between the public respondents and the CSEM respondents,
deletion of web browsing history (t = 7.2, df
= 182, p<.01) , use of peer-to-peer software
(t = 7.3, df = 122, p<.01), use of In-Private
browsing (t = 4.5, df = 118, p<.01), the use
of TOR (t = 3.1, df = 98, p<.01), mislabeling
© 2022 JDFSL
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Table 4. Rationale for choice of storage
Rationale Given
For Ease of Access and Convenience
As a Countermeasure
Because it was the Default Location
Never Stored Any
Other

a directory (t = 3.7, df = 101, p<.01) and securely wiping hard drives (t = 3.8, df = 106,
p<.01) were performed significantly more by
the CSEM group. The use of steganography
was used significantly less (t = -3.7, df = 253,
p<.01) by the CSEM group.
In terms of why they used specific countermeasures related to CSEM, reduction of
anxiety was the reason with the highest aggregate agreement, with 71% (n=55) of respondents indicating agreement. This was
followed by the need to remain anonymous,
with 67% (n=52) of CSEM respondents indicating agreement (Figure 3).

4.

DISCUSSION

Viewing of CSEM was primarily done on laptops and desktops, although a substantial
minority (27%) indicated the use of mobile
phones to view material. Given the growth of
mobile usage amongst CSEM offenders (Steel
et al., 2020) and the age of the offenses in
the sample, this number is very likely higher
at the present time. Only 35% of individuals
indicated they used more than one technology to view CSEM (although this may be
influenced by the aforementioned age of the
offense), indicating that the majority (65%)
of offenders had an exclusive technology preference in how they viewed their material.
Most offenders (53%) viewed CSEM on at
least two different ecosystems. Peer-to-peer
and web ecosystems were the most frequently
employed, and these were also the most frequent technologies used as gateways. Addi© 2022 JDFSL

Proportion and # of Respondents
0.45 (n=35)
0.19 (n=15)
0.14 (n=11)
0.12 (n=9)
0.14 (n=11)

tionally, the majority of individuals (95%) indicated that they started viewing adult SEM
first, indicating initial viewing of erotic material was not child-focused. Most offenders
(87%) kept using the same ecosystem they
started with, supporting a normalization effect being present. Even when transitioning, most of the transitions occurred between
the two of the ecosystems with the lowest
barriers to entry (web browsing and peer-topeer), with transitions to the dark web being
the next most common. The primary gateway technologies were largely non-social, and
transitions from primarily non-social mechanisms to social mechanisms occurred more
than from social to non-social. Qualitative
research to identify the specific reasons for individual transitions was beyond the scope of
this project but would help elucidate the specific needs or events that caused the change
in technology usage.
The lack of a strong social mechanism
in most gateway technologies is inconsistent
with the causal mechanisms proposed by differential association (Sutherland et al., 1992).
Differential association would suggest that
initial CSEM offending behaviour is learned
through communication with other, potentially more experienced, offenders. Because
there is no a priori peer interaction in initial usage (there is the possibility of offline
peer influence, though the likelihood of a high
prevalence of this is improbable), individuals would not initially learn values, attitudes,
techniques, and motives and then turn to
criminality, or alternatively seek to emulate
Page 9
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Figure 3. CSEM respondents’ reasons for using countermeasures
Table 5. Countermeasure usage by CSEM Offenders *difference between offender and reference
population p<.01
Activity
I have deleted my web browsing activity
I have used peer-to-peer software to download movies, images,
or music
I have used In-Private or other browsing modes to hide my
browsing activity
I have formatted my hard drive or another storage device to
delete content
I have used secure wiping software to erase my hard drive or
another storage device
I have mislabeled a directory or a storage device to hide its
contents
I have encrypted individual files on one of my storage devices
I have used a VPN service to hide my web activity
I have used TOR to access content on the dark web
I have created an email account using a fake name
I have used whole disk encryption on my laptop or desktop
I have created a social media account using a fake name
I have deleted or altered log files to hide my activity
I have read message boards or forums on hiding my activities
I have used a cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitlocker, Etherium, Monero)
I have used a virtual machine to hide my activities
I have never taken any of these actions
I have downloaded a guide on hiding my activities
I have used steganography to hide content

high status individuals within their social
structure (at least initially). Post hoc differential association, however, would still have
an influence on values, attitudes, techniques,
and motives as well as rationalizations to facilitate and exacerbate continued usage, differentiating CSEM usage from other criminal
behaviours. This is further supported by the
relatively low overall importance given to social features in choosing CSEM consumption
technologies. Because of this, for deterrence
Page 10

Proportion and
# (All)
0.86 (n=67)*

Proportion and
# (CSEM)
0.68 (n=53)

Reference
Population
0.49 (n=125)

0.69 (n=54)*

0.63 (n=49)

0.26 (n=66)

0.56 (n=44)*

0.38 (n=30)

0.28 (n=71)

0.4 (n=31)

0.31 (n=24)

0.26 (n=66)

0.4 (n=31)*

0.31 (n=24)

0.17 (n=43)

0.33 (n=26)*

0.28 (n=22)

0.12 (n=31)

0.31 (n=24)
0.26 (n=20)
0.26 (n=20)*
0.26 (n=20)
0.18 (n=14)
0.18 (n=14)
0.17 (n=13)
0.12 (n=9)
0.05 (n=4)
0.05 (n=4)
0.04 (n=3)
0.04 (n=3)
0 (n=0)*

0.18 (n=14)
0.15 (n=12)
0.22 (n=17)
0.13 (n=10)
0.08 (n=6)
0.06 (n=5)
0.1 (n=8)
0.12 (n=9)
0.01 (n=1)
0.04 (n=3)
0.04 (n=3)
0.12 (n=9)
0 (n=0)

0.24 (n=61)
0.28 (n=72)
0.09 (n=23)
0.17 (n=44)
0.18 (n=46)
0.13 (n=34)
0.08 (n=21)
0.1 (n=25)
0.13 (n=32)
0.09 (n=22)
0.21 (n=54)
0.07 (n=18)
0.05 (n=13)

and treatment efforts, targeting dysfunctional
social relationships is unlikely to be effective
as a general approach and may only be appropriate for small subsets of offenders.
When choosing a technology, the most important factors were a mix of safety-related
factors such as the ability to remain anonymous (82%) and the lack of capable guardianship (67%), as well as usability factors such
as ease of use (69%), and the overall availability of content of interest (64%). This shows
© 2022 JDFSL
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that both utility-based factors (ease of use
and content availability) as well as protective factors (anonymity and lack of capable
guardianship) were important. Ease of use
is not necessarily a viable target for deterrence efforts, however the other main factors
do represent viable targets. Since perceived
anonymity and capable guardianship (in the
form of law enforcement) were of high importance, timely interventions and education
targeting these perceptions are potentially
viable. This is consistent with the reduction
seen in usage of web browsing commensurate
with the implementation of warning messages
(Steel, 2015), and may indicate that including
the individuals IP address in those messages
might have an even higher deterrence effect
(targeting perceived anonymity). Additionally, investigative efforts prioritizing large distributors on peer-to-peer networks (targeting
content availability) have a potential deterrence effect, and there is a theoretical basis
for the efficacy of seeding peer-to-peer networks with “warning” messages integrated
into fake CSEM files.
For risk evaluation, digital forensics and
sentencing purposes, 19% of respondents reported not storing CSEM at all (viewing
only). As a result, the breadth and quantity of images and videos found are not an
accurate measure of the actual content consumption behaviour for a substantial proportion of respondents. Expecting the presence
of images and videos to confirm illegal activity is therefore neither sufficient nor should
it be necessary to determine consumption.
As bandwidth increases and persistence of
CSEM for availability purposes remains high,
viewing without storage may become more
commonplace.
When storing content, the most common
reason for choosing a particular medium was
related to convenience and later viewing, with
a smaller proportion citing the mechanism of
© 2022 JDFSL

storage as a countermeasure. This dynamic
would be expected to change over time based
on two competing mechanisms. First, if deterrence efforts (or other factors) cause the
availability and persistence of specific content
to decline (Bissias et al., 2016), storage would
be likely to increase. Second, increases in
bandwidth and other technological advances
that allow more ready access to CSEM would
likely cause the storage to decrease. Previously, the costs of storage (e.g., floppy disks
and early spinning hard drives) provided a
limiting factor on storage, however the low
cost of storage and inexpensive availability of
tens of terabytes of local storage have largely
removed that as a factor.
Of particular interest in selecting the locations to store their content, a larger number
of individuals cited the benefits of easy access
and usage over those doing so as a countermeasure. Additionally, while the overall use
of countermeasures was higher in the CSEM
group, the countermeasures used more frequently were mostly those that were low-tech
(deleting browsing history, using In-Private
browsing) or specific to the CSEM content
acquisition (using peer-to-peer and Tor). Of
specific interest, there was no statistically significant difference in the use of encryption between the non-offender and the CSEM respondent groups. Because the use of encryption
is uncommon, selective encryption of CSEM
content can be considered a significant factor in showing awareness by an offender that
its possession is not socially (or potentially
legally) acceptable. Future research is needed
to determine if there are common characteristics in the subset of CSEM offenders that
use technically advanced countermeasures.
Countermeasure usage appears to have
been used to reduce the psychological strain
of CSEM activities, with using it to reduce
anxiety having the highest levels of overall
agreement. This was followed by anonymity,
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which serves a psychological as well as a precautionary role. Although these were the
highest rated motivations, the use of encryption for precautionary purposes (to avoid detection or hinder law enforcement) was also
rated high, showing that there were mixed
motivations present.

5.

LIMITATIONS

Due to the age of the convictions, which were
as far back as ten years prior to the study,
the reported technology usage represents historical usage and may not be representative
of current usage of new technologies. In particular, the move toward mobile may only
be partially reflected in the data above. The
large focus of law enforcement on peer-to-peer
investigations in the period under investigation may also have had an influence on the
results. The specific conviction dates were
not solicited for anonymity purposes to avoid
the potential identification of an individual
when combined with the responses to other
demographic questions.
For countermeasure usage, the rates reported are those that were intentionally used
beyond the built-in countermeasures present.
For example, storage on a mobile phone with
default encryption (iPhone 6 Plus - Technical Specifications, 2019) would be present
for a subset of users and therefore actual usage in practice is expected to be higher than
the explicitly chosen usage identified in this
research. Additionally, the aggregate agreement with reasons for using countermeasures
were elicited, but the respondents were not
asked to rank the individual reasons, limiting comparisons of relative value to a specific
individual. Finally, there is a potential sampling bias in that the use of countermeasures
may have precluded detection or conviction.
The populations for the two surveys were
both English-speaking individuals at least 18
years of age living in the United States. This
Page 12

limits generalization of the findings without
additional research. Additionally, individuals self-selected to participate in the survey,
though the demographics were overall consistent with the general demographics found in
other studies of CSEM offenders.
While the quality problems present in Internet survey research are well established,
the validation and attention checks employed
are believed to have minimized these in this
research. Finally, there was a Covid-19 outbreak that occurred during the course of this
research, which may have influenced response
rates and unemployment numbers (Coibion
et al., 2020).

6.

CONCLUSION

This research provided insight into which
technologies individuals use to consume and
retain CSEM material. CSEM consumption
and storage patterns of CSEM indicated individuals showed preferential behaviour toward
a single technology, with a substantial minority of users using multiple technologies.
Changes in technology usage patterns over
time support social factors being a potential
facilitator of ongoing CSEM usage, but not
initial CSEM usage. For deterrence efforts,
therefore, attempts to interdict initial CSEM
viewing by preventing associations (or vicarious associations), is less likely to be successful
than attempts to disrupt ongoing reinforcement through those same associations.
Previously convicted CSEM offenders used
more countermeasures than non-offenders,
though these may be in response to having
been previously caught. Although they used
more countermeasures, they tended to use
countermeasures that were less sophisticated
- notably, encryption usage was no higher in
the CSEM group than the reference group.
The most supported reason for using countermeasures in their CSEM activities was to reduce psychological strain, not as a precaution© 2022 JDFSL
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ary action. The use of countermeasures as an
unhealthy coping mechanism provides input
to treatment plans and supports approaches
that provide alternative coping mechanisms,
particularly if the consumption of CSEM is
related to life stressors for a particular individual.
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